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Abstract 
 
Inequality is rising in the United States. One of the possible ramifications of this trend 
could be a shift in the political landscape over the next couple decades. In particular, 
Americans could become more divided politically on class-based lines due to the 
economic strain put on the working class. Using data from the University of Mary 
Washington’s Center for Leadership and Media Studies’ 2014 Survey, this paper strives 
to explore the current landscape of class-based politics. First, it explores if class-based 
politics are still salient in Virginia by examining if there is a correlation between an 
individuals’ self-defined class and various political beliefs. If not, then it explores why 
class-based politics do not affect political choices. 
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Over the course of the last 25 years, the United States has seen an increase in 
inequality. The Gini coefficient, an oft-used measurement of inequality, shows the 
United States moving toward a more unequal society. The Congressional Budget Office 
found the Gini coefficient “rose from 0.48 in 1979 to 0.59 in 2007,” and the United 
States Census Bureau found the Gini coefficient rose from 0.40 in the 1979s to 0.47 in 
2010 (Dadush 2012: 6). Accompanying the rise in inequality are “worrying factors” like 
“increased prevalence of poverty, increased macroeconomic instability,” and increased 
spending on “positional goods” (Dadush 2012: 25). But there are other ramifications 
from increased inequality as well.  
Politicians have started to notice the growth of income inequality in the United 
States and have begun to respond accordingly, often striking a more populist tone that 
speaks to the working class. Former Florida Governor Jeb Bush, who is currently the 
top polling candidate in numerous GOP 2016 presidential primary polls (e.g. Agiesta 
2015, ABC News/Washington Post 2015), said in a speech in Detroit recently: “The 
opportunity gap is the defining issue of our time. More Americans are stuck at their 
income levels than ever before. It’s very hard for people to go from the bottom rungs of 
the economy to the top or even the middle. This should alarm you. It has alarmed me” 
(Vox 2015). 
Former Secretary of State and 2016 Democratic presidential candidate Hillary 
Clinton has talked about income inequality as well. In her 2016 presidential 
announcement, Clinton said: “Americans have fought their way back from tough 
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economic times. But the deck is still stacked in favor of those at the top. Everyday 
Americans need a champion” (Clinton 2015). 
But because American politicians are speaking about an issue does not 
necessarily mean the issue matters to ordinary Americans. This purpose of this paper is 
to find if American politicians are correct in assuming the growth of inequality matters to 
Americans when deciding their political beliefs. To do so, the paper will explore if there 
is a correlation between self-defined class in Virginians and their basic political opinions. 
If so, it will explore why there is the correlation. If not, it will explore why the correlation 
does not exist. 
After all, the implications of the class can have drastic effects. In 2014 alone, 
United States candidates for public office spent $3,665,416,368 on elections, a number 
that has increased dramatically over the last decade (Open Secrets 2014). A better 
understanding of the effect of class on voting would have huge consequences for 
campaign microtargeting, not to mention shape the way Americans view politics and the 
actors therein.  
History of Class 
Class has affected American society since colonial times. One of the most 
striking examples of pre-revolutionary class was the Deep South. Antebellum 
southerners were divided into very clear groups based on their income (and, as was the 
norm at the time, the color of one’s skin): the landed aristocracy; the poor, but free, 
yeoman; and the enslaved African-Americans. Many of America’s Founding Fathers 
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came from this system in Virginia and were slave-owners themselves: George 
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison (Greene 2000). 
Frontier America became an important breeding ground of a different type of 
class system. Free land for free men set up a system in which all those who moved 
west started as equals, no one had a past. Life on the plains was difficult, which meant 
that settlers often had to rely on one another. These factors led to the American West 
being fairly egalitarian. This egalitarianism, coupled with a strong hatred of the northeast 
and the railroad barons, led to the rise of Prairie Populism in the mid-19th century 
(Hicks 1961, Peffer and Argersinger 1991). 
 The history of class identification in the United States is not free of violence. Like 
other countries, the United States has seen its fair share of political infighting over class 
issues. One of the most significant class based event in United States history was the 
Haymarket affair. Following three days of strikes and the killing of two striking workers in 
Chicago on May 3, 1884, union and socialist leaders called for strikes in Haymarket 
Square. The next day, the protesters assembled and rallied until the police came to 
break up the crowd. Shortly after the lead officer called for the rally to stop, someone 
threw and bomb in front of the police and gunfire broke out. The ensuing violence left 11 
dead and many more wounded (David 1958). 
 Even as recently as 2011, the United States saw a fight over economic injustice. 
The national Occupy movement, which started as the Occupy Wall Street movement, 
had a very populist message. It highlighted the struggles of the working and middle 
class, calling on political leaders to change policies in support of these classes. 
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Occupy’s catchphrase “We are the 99%,” as opposed to the wealthy “1%,” lent itself to 
the lower classes and their struggle. (Calhoun 2013) 
 Like most class-based demonstrations in the United States, neither the 
Haymarket affair nor the Occupy movement made any immediate changes to the 
socioeconomic landscape. However, as a consequence of the Haymarket affair, the 
United States moved a step closer to an eight-hour workday (David 1958). Occupy, on 
the other hand, so far has had less time for its consequences to percolate. 
What is social class? 
 America is divided into classes, different rungs on a socioeconomic ladder, but 
how does one define a class? What does it mean if someone is working class? Or 
middle class? In order to determine one’s class, many different factors need to be taken 
into account: income, access to capital, position in society, etc. Then, one must look at 
the effect of how these different factors affect one another and which ones matter most. 
         Perhaps the most internationally influential class theory is Karl Marx’s theory of 
class. Marx argued that all class is derived from one’s position in the means of 
production. He wrote that human social organization started around the satisfaction of 
basic human needs, meaning society is organized around the production of goods that 
fulfill those needs- the economy. Marx defines two distinct classes based on his theory 
of social organization and its relationship with the means of production: the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie. The proletariat produces goods that fulfill human needs and are 
therefore employed by others, and the bourgeoisie are the owners of the means of 
productions and can purchase the labor of others- the proletariat. Of course, Marx 
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ultimately wanted the self-identification of the proletariat, which, he argued, would lead 
to the inevitable overthrow of the capitalist system (Marx, 1867). 
 In opposition to Marx’s economic basis of class was Max Weber’s stratified 
theory of societal order. Weber argued there was more to societal order than economic 
position alone. In fact, Weber asserted society divides itself into three groups: classes, 
status groups, and parties. According to Weber, classes are “bases for communal 
action,” not “communities.” Essentially, classes are just groups of people that have the 
common “life chances.” That is, their economic situation in terms of “possession of 
goods and opportunities for income” is similar. Communities, he argues, arrange 
themselves into hierarchies and people fit themselves into these hierarchies, which 
often do not depend on an individuals’ class or property ownership. By parties, Weber 
does not refer to the modern, American idea of political parties. Instead, he defined 
parties as groups that acquire “social power,” which is the ability for an individual to 
have their desires met despite opposition. These determinants create a pliable system 
of societal order, which changes depending on the circumstances of the time (Weber, 
Gerth, and Mills 1946, Bendix 1960). 
 It has been 131 years since Karl Marx’s death, and 94 years since Max Weber’s, 
but the definition of class remains unsolved. Since Marx and Weber’s death, class 
theorists have moved beyond their definition of classes but have kept the roots of their 
ideas.  
Some theorists retained Marx’s idea of a society split between two social classes, 
but they argue these classes have decomposed into subclasses (Dahrendorf 1959, 
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Wright 1985). Neo-Marxists argue the “decomposition of labor” is why Marx’s working 
class revolution has not happened. The working class (proletariat) cannot be seen as a 
wholly singular group anymore (Dahrendorf 1959). For example, these workers could be 
divided into three independent groups: skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled (Clark and 
Lipset 1991).  
Other theorists have diverged from Marx’s system of classes by creating 
multilevel systems, which compensate for Marx’s broad class definitions. For example, 
Erik Wright broke Marx’s two-category system into a 12-category system. His model 
includes groups going from proletariat to bourgeoisie, with categories such as small 
employers and top managers in between (Wright 1985). 
Other theorists base their ideas on Weberian theory. In the context of America as 
a post-industrial state, these theories break up societies into different groups that play a 
stronger or weaker role, depending on the situation. For example, the idea of traditional 
classes has been broken up because a rise of new issue-based groups: religion, 
gender, race, etc. (Heath 1991). Others even argue that new forms of social classes are 
emerging. For example, as income rises, traditional hierarchies and collectivism are 
weakened. A weakening of these traditional models of societal order has led to an 
increased sense of individualism. However, Americans still need something around 
which to coalesce, which has led to new an increase in the relevance of non-class 
based strata (Clark and Lipset 1991). 
Class Salience in a Modern Context 
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 Even if one can settle on one definition of class, there is the issue of class’s 
salience in contemporary, American society. Does socioeconomic class still affect 
Americans’ decision-making and what effect, if any, will it have in the future? 
Unsurprisingly, seeing as they cannot decide on a universal definition of class, theorists 
do not agree on whether class remains a salient part of Americans’ lives. 
 One argument is that traditional, economic-based hierarchies are declining. 
These hierarchies support traditional socioeconomic classes by reaffirming “class-
defined patterns in informal social relations, cultural outlooks, and support for social 
change” (Clark and Lipset 1991, 402). Large class divisions are caused by great 
differentiation between classes in society, and conversely, small class divisions are 
caused by small divisions between classes in society. However, the divisions among 
classes in society need not be income based. Like in Weberian theory, the 
differentiation can come from differences in status or power as well. For example, a 
society could be sharply divided into two classes (producers and owners) and have 
relatively similar income levels, but the classes are still bitterly divided (Clark and Lipset 
1991). 
 The converse of both the above rules applies as well. If differentiation of 
traditional hierarchies declines, social classes decrease in relevance as well. For 
example, a society with little differentiation between its societal groups will likely have 
little class activity. However, the decrease in class conflict does not equate to less 
conflict overall. Conflict, instead, is organized around other issues (e.g. social issues 
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and race). Moreover, the less divided the classes are, the less likely that different 
groups would have distinct cultural differences (Clark and Lipset 1991). 
 The growth of the American economy has weakened traditional hierarchies, 
which, in turn, has weakened the traditional class system in America. Over the past one 
hundred years, the United States has emerged as the world’s sole superpower, 
meaning more affluence for all Americans, and the creation of an expansive social 
safety net As a result, many Americans can worry less than their ancestors did about 
material interests. More affluence has meant lower class Americans are not as reliant 
on material support from the upper class, which has led to a decrease in class 
consciousness and, as a consequence, a rise in individualism (Clark and Lipset 1991). 
 If a rise in affluence is what is fueling a breakdown in class consciousness in the 
United States, then rising economic inequality in the United States may soon break the 
trend. Economic inequality is rising in the United States, and the amount of taxes and 
governmental transfers that bring down inequality have also dropped. (Dadush 2012). 
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 Other, not-as-obvious variables are affecting how Americans view class as well. 
Variables like increased technological innovation, immigration and its effect on 
nepotism, and declining familial hierarchies have brought down the rates of class 
consciousness in the United States. In fact, the more societal hierarchies decline, the 
more traditional class identities decline (Clark and Lipset 1991). 
 Despite all the indications that social classes should be less prevalent in today’s 
society, research indicates that American’s self-identification of class has not changed 
drastically, although there has been modest change in favor of the middle class. In 
1949, 49% of Americans identified themselves as part of the working class and 45% 
self-identified as members of the middle class (Centers 1949). By 2000, the number of 
(Dadush 2012: 10) 
Figure 1 
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Americans who identified as members of the middle class had risen to 59% and the 
number of Americans who identified as members of the working class had fallen to 
41%1 (Hout 2007). Although these numbers show a growth in the middle class, they 
also indicate that class-consciousness is not dead in the United States, as a significant 
portion of the population still identifies with the working class. 
 But self-identifying with a social class does not conclusively mean that an 
American belongs to that class. For the most part, Americans understand social classes 
and can explain each class properly, although the term “working class” must often be 
prompted, likely because Americans would otherwise think of themselves as middle 
class (Hout 2007). However, Americans are not particularly good at naming their correct 
social class. Although a majority of working class Americans correctly identify their 
social class, “a substantial percentage inflates their class” (Sosnaud, Brady, and Frenk 
2013: 90), half of middle class voters also have correctly correlate their perceived social 
class with their actual social class. However, upper-middle class voters overwhelmingly 
lower their actual class, with “more than 71 percent deflat[ing] their class position” (ibid: 
90). When class was stratified into more categories than working, middle, and upper-
middle class, Americans were even better at identifying their socioeconomic class. This 
signified most Americans are “familiar enough with class terminology to place 
themselves more or less where experts would put them…” (Hout 2007: 34). 
 
                                                
1  I would like to add a word of caution when viewing these numbers as hard-and-fast support for a rising 
middle class. The late 1990s and early 2000s were a time of extraordinary growth in the United States 
and therefore would see an inflated view of household income and class status. 
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A Decline in Class Voting? 
 Regardless of whether class consciousness is stable or declining, its effect on 
American elections is changing. For the most part, theorists agree class-based voting 
the United States and in Western European democracies is declining (Heath 1991, 
Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995). The ramifications from any change in political behavior in 
the United States are monumental, and a decrease in class-based voting is no 
exception. 
 Theorists who use a relative decrease in class voting believe “a modest process 
of class secularization probably did occur” (Heath 1991, 78). In this model, theorists 
determine vote totals based on how much each class votes for a political party on a 
yearly basis. Others scholars use the absolute model of political change, which shows 
that a decrease in class voting “definitely occurred.” This model takes a much broader 
look at the class system and instead views how much the entire system overall has 
changed (Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995). 
 Perhaps the most visible example of supposed declining social class in America 
is the decrease in class-based voting. According to the Alford Index of Class Voting, 
working class-based voting for Left political parties has declined in every western 
country that has available data (Clark and Lipset 1991). The Alford Index of Class 
Voting shows what percentage of a given class vote for Left or Right parties. To find the 
Alford Index for a country’s Left party among working class voters, subtract the working 
class votes for the Right party from the working class votes from the Left party. The 
remaining is the Alford Index score (Alford 1962). Other mathematical models show a 
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decline in class-based voting as well. Harold Clarke’s Consistency Voting Index is 
derived from the Alford Index of Class Voting but takes into account third parties as well 
(Clarke’s research focuses primarily on British voters) (Clarke 2004). The Relative Class 
Voting Index takes the middle class’s odds of voting for conservative parties divided by 
their odds of voting for liberal parties (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1985). Regardless of 
the model chosen, class-based voting in Western democracies is declining, which can 
be seen in the image below.  
But, like the disagreement among theorists over the salience of class in 
American society and the very definition of class itself, scholars cannot agree what 
causes the decrease in class voting. In fact, some do not even believe class voting has 
decreased (e.g. Heath 1991). 
Figure 2 
Class-based Party Support in Britain, 1964-2001 (Clarke 2004) 
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Theories that explore a drop in class-based political activity are explained as a 
breakup of class-based, political ideology (reminiscent of Marx’s view that “every class 
struggle is a political struggle” (Marx and Engels 1948)). Five major theories have 
emerged explaining this drop-off, which are outlined below (Goldthorpe and Clark 2001, 
Monza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). Of course, there are also many theorists who do not 
believe that there has been a decline in class-based voting (e.g. Bartels 2006, Pulzer 
1987). These theories are presented juxtaposed to the drop-off theories. 
First, there is a general “embourgeoisement” of the working class, although it is 
mostly an antiquated system of looking at class-based voting decline. That is, as 
members of the working class become more skilled, which lead to higher incomes and 
living standards, they “assimilate into middle-class society” (Moore 1966, cf. Goldthorpe 
1968). Similarly, there is a “proletarianization” of white-collar workers. White-collar 
workers, largely members of the middle class, are adopting working class tendencies, 
like organizing themselves into labor unions (Jelin 1979). Affecting embourgeoisement 
and proletarianization is social mobility and occupational mobility. The more mobile a 
society is along these variables, the more likely citizens will be to identify with a middle 
class (Turner 1992, Weakliem 1995) or the more likely that they will identify with the 
class they are moving toward, rather than the class to which they belong (De Graff, 
Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 1995).2 If embourgeoisement and proletarianization affects 
modern class consciousness, then Americans are moving toward believing they all 
belong to a universal middle class. 
                                                
2 De Graff, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath find that there is an “acculturation to the class of destination” among 
mobile intergenerational groups. 
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 Although the idea of highly skilled, working class individuals identifying with the 
middle class sounds theoretically sound, studies testing embourgeoisement have found 
little empirical evidence of its existence. (Goldthorpe 1968, Hamilton 1972). Likewise, 
social mobility has not been as strong as hypothesized by theorists who believe in class 
decay (Turner 1992). For these empirical reasons, embourgeoisement is seen as an 
antiquated way of looking at class-based voting decay. 
 Second, Americans are moving toward new divisions that are more important in 
post-industrial America than class divisions. New “identity” struggles are replacing old 
class bonds. These issues include the Gender and Sexual Minorities (GSM) equal rights 
movement, regional movements, and gender, race, and ethnicity movements (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991). These issues are not new societal divisions but have 
become more prominent in recent decades (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). 
 The idea of issue struggles becoming more prominent in American society than 
class is reminiscent of Weber’s “parties” and “communities.”  The groups that coalesce 
around various social issues and thereby acquire “social power” create communities, 
which are not affected by members’ classes. These communities form parties, which 
are the groups actively working for change despite opposition (Weber 1946). 
This movement does not mean lower classes support redistributive policies less. 
In fact, research indicates low--income households were more likely to support welfare 
policies than high--income households, including middle class households (Bobo 1991). 
Instead, class-based voting is becoming subordinate to other types of stratification. 
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  The most prominent empirical explanation of class becoming subordinate to 
new, social division of society is the impact of race. These theorists claim that race has 
begun to take over class as a key element in voting. They use the Deep South as 
evidence of this trend, pointing to overwhelming African American support of the 
Democrats and majority white support of the Republicans after the civil rights laws in the 
1960s. Democrats, they argue have become the party of racial equality, while 
Republicans have become the party that looks out for the interests of whites. This party 
reclassifying has led to members of every class becoming split between the two parties 
(Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989, Edsall and Edsall 1991). 
 However, theorists who claim that there is a continued significance of class in 
voting show that race is not a divisive issue among classes. They argue, “Significant 
dealignment may have begun in the 1960s as postulated by advocates of the racial 
realignment thesis,” but “class voting indexes returned to levels found in the 1950s.” 
This trend means that there is no significant dealignment of classes based on racial 
dynamics (Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1995). 
 Third, Americans are gradually becoming more educated, which fundamentally 
changes how they view themselves. Rather than being constricted to class loyalty, a 
more educated American citizenry identifies itself with and makes rational, political 
decisions based on an educated opinion. In making this change, Americans make 
decisions based on calculative, long-term determinations, rather than collective 
identities. (Dalton 2014, Heath 1991) 
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 No consensus has been reached over the effect of a more educated populace, 
however. Although the issue has been explored in depth by researchers, scholars are 
unsure what the effects of a more educated populace are. As one scholar bluntly put it, 
most data was “still unused” (Smith 1989).  
 Four, fundamentally, the working class has decreased. As a proportion of the 
population, the manual, working class has declined, leaving the traditional left parties to 
absorb parts of the middle class, or ultimately, face endless defeat. However, by 
attracting middle class voters into the party, they “suffer a loss of opportunities among 
narrowly defined workers,” because the parties satisfy only the mutual interests of the 
two groups- working class and middle class- and therefore do not satiate the needs of 
the working class (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). These supra-class themes drive 
down the class-based vote, causing less class-based cleavages (Manza, Hout, and 
Brooks 1995). On top of these divisions, some theorists argue that, as new, 
international, competitive markets emerge, new fragmentations emerge, as all classes 
of declining industries bind together for survival (Logan and Molotch 1987, Offe 1999). 
 Theorists who disagree with this model argue that Left parties have not lost a 
considerable number of votes compared with earlier periods. Since these parties did not 
lose votes despite a supposed drop in total working class voters, these parties were 
able to sustain their working class votes while incorporating new, middle class votes 
(Pulzer 1987). Furthermore, they assert that the new, competitive changes to 
international politics have not broken down class barriers and forced agreement among 
classes on economic issues (Hibbs 1982). Moreover, accompanying the new, 
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international economy are problems like declining rates of social mobility (Hout 1988), 
which will likely lead to more class polarization (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993). 
Finally, the traditional, class-based left is being joined by a “New Left,” which is 
made up of members of the middle class (Inglehart 1990: 375). This group is made up 
of environmentalists, women, racial minorities, and the GSM community, among others. 
(Claus 1999) People take economic necessities for granted with an increase in wealth. 
Their focus instead turns to “life-style and amenities.” The issues these voters care 
about “social issues” rather than “traditional class political issues,” like fighting for 
“ownership and control of the means of production.” (Clark and Lipset 1991, 405) These 
groups being added to the political calculation muddies the waters, causing the 
traditionally united lower class to break apart. This phenomenon is especially relevant in 
younger generations, especially with young people from “more affluent and hierarchical 
societies.” (Clark and Lipset 1991) Young, middle class people have “postmaterialist” 
values, like those touted by the new left, more than older generations. The youth also 
focus less on “materialist” concerns more than older generations, issues that typically 
made up the bulk of concerns valued by the working class. Therefore, the older, working 
class generations, which valued “materialist” concerns and made up the old left, slowly 
are being replaced by newer, middle class generations, which emphasize 
“postmaterialist” values. These individuals are the most likely to transition from 
traditional class-based parties (Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson 
1994, Inglehart 1990). 
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In a study of 12 Western European states, André Freire found “social factors are 
a very important dimension in explaining individual left–right orientation” (Freire 2006: 
371). The author performed a regression analysis on issues important to respondents 
when determining their position on a left-right spectrum on two surveys in 11 of the 
countries and one survey in one. He found “social factors” were the most important 
factor in determining left-right orientation in twelve cases, while “partisan orientation” 
was the most important factor in only eight of the 23 cases (ibid. 370). Therefore, the 
author argues, “‘social identities’ are gaining ground, particularly among the younger 
generations,” while “individuals’ positions within the social structure have been...of 
decreasing importance in the explanation of their left–right political orientations” (ibid. 
372). 
This trend can be seen particularly well in portions of the American Midwest. 
Thomas Frank describes in “What’s the Matter with Kansas?” that, as hot-button, 
“explosive” social issues become more important in the political discourse, working 
class, white Americans have been fleeing the Democratic Party in droves, making many 
Midwestern states (e.g. Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) among the darkest red 
states. However, many Midwesterners’ single-mindedness regarding social issues has 
led to state governments passing economic policies that do not benefit most people, 
especially those in the working class. Frank postulates his idea can be projected to 
social conservatives across the United States. Many social conservatives are from 
economically depressed classes and voting for conservative candidates constitutes 
voting against their own economic self-interest (Frank 2004). 
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Joseph Gerteis (1998) also found social issues are becoming less important for 
explaining the differences between the political left and right. In his study of the 
fragmentation of the American middle class, Gereis found, “Republican policies have 
alienated the party’s traditional middle-class support,” while a similar phenomenon has 
“afflicted the left” (ibid: 662). Gerteis’s research points toward a decline in the relevance 
of “traditional welfare-state issues,” such as national spending on welfare, for which 
Gerteis tested (ibid: 663). Instead, Gerteis’s research indicates toward the growing 
importance of social issues in defining how middle class Americans vote. 
 As Larry Bartels explains in “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with 
Kansas?” the idea that socially conservative voters are moving away from the 
Democratic Party and becoming more conservative is false. White, working class 
support for the Democratic Party has actually increased over the last 20 years. The 
ideological views of white, working class individuals have not changed either. In fact, 
social issues are less related to party identification than economic issues among 
working class voters, although social issues have because more related to voting 
preference in middle and upper class white voters (Bartels 2006). 
 Critics of the New Left theory point to foundational problems with the research 
behind it. For example, they point to Ronald Inglehart’s work, who is a prominent post-
material theorist. In many of his works, Inglehart argues the theory that “new,” 
“postmaterial” social movements are overtaking old, “materialist” movements in post-
industrial nations. The issues that matter to new generations are shifting away from 
“materialist concerns about economic and physical security toward greater emphasis on 
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freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life” (Inglehart and Abramson 1994, 336). 
He argues, these issues do not appeal to the lower classes, causing the working class 
disenfranchisement (Inglehart 1990, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and 
Abramson 1994).  
But critics point to Inglehart’s definition of postmaterial and material as 
problematic. First, the issues that Inglehart points to have not substantially changed in 
value to the public. Some scholars have found that material issues have remained 
stable and the postmaterial issue changes that have occurred “do not amount to a net 
increase in the popularity of these concerns” (Brooks and Manza 1994, 561). Others 
have found “there is some evidence that the traditional class division is becoming less 
important, but no sign that the postmaterialist dimension is becoming more important 
(Weakliem 1991). Regardless of their differences, they both find that Inglehart’s 
conclusion is false.  
For example, in a study of American mayors in 1991, Clark and Lipset found 
“fiscal and social liberalism were virtually unrelated” for mayors of any age. Clark and 
Lipset did find, as the mayors got older, the differentiation between fiscal and social 
liberalism among French mayors is shrinking, which points to a decline in class voting in 
France. However, the results do not hold true for the United States (Clark and Lipset 
1991: 405). 
Postmaterial issues- such as environmentalism and feminism - appeal to “issues 
of personal and societal security.” That is, these issues are designed to boost most 
people’s “personal well-being and security.” Take, for example, feminism. Many feminist 
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campaigns push equal pay for equal work, which directly affects material issues. This 
idea that these so-called postmaterial issues do not affect material well-being is 
incorrect. Not to mention, the idea that these are new movements are insulting to older 
generations (Brooks and Manza 1994). These issues have come in waves throughout 
the United States’ history: “second wave” feminism came from 19th and 20th century 
feminism (e.g. Cott 1987), environmentalism came from the conservation movement 
(e.g. Warren 2003), and nuclear disarmament came from previous peace movements 
(e.g. Kleidman 1993). 
If Americans are beginning to decide political choices based on non-class based 
issues, politicians and political campaigns need to respond accordingly. This response 
must include a shift away from economic issues and a move toward social issues. For 
example, in the 2012 American presidential election, President Obama’s campaign tried 
to use Mitt Romney’s “47 percent” comment to encourage working class voters that 
Romney did not care about them. The video in which Romney made the remark was 
released on September 17, after which the President received no boost in support (Corn 
2012). On September 17, the average percentage the President was polling was 48.1 
percent, while Romney was at 44 percent. A week later, the President was polling 48.2 
percent and Romney polled 44.2 percent, no difference between the days (Huffington 
Post 2012). 
Hypotheses 
 My hypotheses for this paper are going to be split into two parts. In the first, I 
have three hypotheses. In these, I will to explore how class correlates with basic 
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political beliefs, namely political party, ideology, and support for an increase in the 
minimum wage. Hopefully, these will set a baseline understanding of class and its 
effects. The results of these hypotheses will determine whether the growth of income 
inequality has led to a more class-based political system or if the reason for political 
beliefs comes from elsewhere. 
My first hypothesis is I believe there will be no correlation between political party 
preference and self-defined class. Frankly, most of the research about class identity 
points to a decrease in the strength of class-based voting in the United States (Crewe 
1986, Weakliem 1995). Even among the less numerous scholars who argue in support 
of class-based voting, their admittance that class secularization has happened indicates 
class-based voting is on the decline (Heath 1991). 
 My second hypothesis explores the relationship between self-defined class and 
political ideology. Similar to political party, I posit there will be no correlation between 
political ideology and self-defined class. Since political party and ideology are typically 
connected (Highton and Kam 2011), it follows if there is no correlation between political 
party and self-defined class, there will be no correlation between political ideology and 
class. 
 My third hypothesis explores the relationship between self-defined class and 
support for an increase in the minimum wage. I believe the lower an individual’s self-
defined class, the more likely they will support an increase in the minimum wage to 
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$10.10 an hour.3 This hypothesis follows the logic that working class individuals are 
more likely to support policies that liberalism’s economic ideals, like raising the 
minimum wage (Bartels 2006, Brooks and Manza 1994, Weakliem 1991). 
 In my second set of hypotheses, I will explore how identity politics and 
postmaterialism are affecting class-based voting. To do so, I will look at the relationship 
between class, race, support for same-sex marriage, and political party in four 
hypotheses. If class does not determine political beliefs, these hypotheses will 
determine from where Virginians get their political beliefs. 
 First, I believe people who self-identify as “black” will be more likely to identify 
with the Democratic Party than with the Republican Party, and people who self-identify 
as “white” will be more likely to identify with the Republican Party than with the 
Democratic Party, since Americans are moving in the direction of arranging parties 
behind identity strata (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989, Edsall and Edsall 1991, Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991). 
Second, I believe people who support same-sex marriage will be more likely to 
identify with the Democratic Party than with the Republican Party, and people who 
oppose same-sex marriage will be more likely to identify with the Republican Party than 
with the Democratic Party, since Americans are shifting to arranging parties based off 
postmaterial issues instead of class (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, 
Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998). 
                                                
3 The $10.10 per hour is not arbitrary. The number is what minimum wage would be if it had been indexed 
at inflation at its peak in the 1960s. 
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Third, I hypothesize there will be no correlation between race and support for an 
increase in the minimum wage. If identity politics are taking over the old, class-based 
politics, then one’s race should not affect how they view economic issues, only their 
political party preference (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991). Therefore, race may 
affect how one votes, but not their opinion on the minimum wage. 
Finally, I believe there will be no correlation between support for same sex 
marriage and support for an increase in the minimum wage. Similar to race in my third 
hypothesis, postmaterial views should have no effect on materialist issues like the 
minimum wage, affecting only vote choice (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, 
Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998). Support for the minimum 
wage, therefore, should not be affected by support for same-sex marriage. 
Methods 
 The data I used to test my hypotheses comes from the University of Mary 
Washington Center for Leadership and Media Studies Fall 2014 survey of Virginia. The 
survey collects a statewide, representative sample of English interviews of 1,000 
Virginian adults aged 18 and older, 500 on landline and 500 on cell phone. The full 
survey has a margin of error of ±3.5 percent. It was conducted from October 1-6, 2014. 
 Using data from the University of Mary Washington survey does have some 
drawbacks. First, it has a smaller sample size than a nationwide survey. With only 1,000 
respondents, it has a considerably smaller pool than, for example, the thousands-large 
American National Election Survey. Second, because of the small size of the survey, 
there are fewer questions to use to check hypotheses. Third, extrapolating data from 
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Virginia to the whole United States is problematic. Granted, Virginia’s political makeup is 
similar to the entire United States, voting for the two major party candidates in 2012 by 
almost the same margin as the nation as a whole (Federal Election Commission 2013). 
However, an argument can be made that Virginia is a miniature United States: low-
income west, agricultural south, industrial southeast, and urban, highly educated North. 
Moreover, Virginia has similar racial makeup to the whole United States, 69 percent 
white compared to 72 percent white nationally (Farnsworth 2012). 
I focused on five questions in the University of Mary Washington survey. For 
each question, if the respondent volunteered their own answer, answered “don’t know,” 
or refused to answer the question, I dropped them from the study. Thankfully, there 
were only 23 people who responded these ways, just 2.3 percent of respondents. 
Obviously the reasons why people would not answer about their class or political beliefs 
is interesting, but not the purpose of this study. 
The first question I focused on was, “Would you say you are: upper class, middle 
class, working class, or lower class?” 5.2 percent of Virginians viewed themselves as 
members of the upper class, while 45.5 percent, 34.1 percent, and 12.9 percent viewed 
themselves as members of the middle, working, and lower class, respectively. I 
recalculated the results into two different social classes: the middle class and the 
working class. This change left 50.7 percent middle class and 47.0 percent working 
class. 
The second question I focused on asked “Generally speaking do you consider 
yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or an independent?” A plurality of Virginians identify 
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with the Democratic Party, 35.7 percent. The second most likely response was 
independent, at 34.7 percent. Respondents were least likely to identify with the 
Republican Party, with just 25.2 percent of Virginians doing so. 
The third question deals with respondents’ political ideology. They were asked “In 
general, would you describe your political views as very liberal, liberal, moderate, 
conservative, or very conservative?” Due to the size of the sample, I chose to condense 
this question into a three-part ideology scale, rather than the original five-part ideology 
scale. This left me with three groups: liberal, moderate, and conservative. After this 
alteration, there were 22.4 percent liberal, 38.2 percent moderate, and 34.4% 
conservative. 
The fourth question asks respondents about their views on raising the minimum 
wage: “Would you support or oppose Congress passing legislation that would raise the 
minimum wage in this country from $7.25 per hour to $10.10 per hour?” 67.5 percent of 
respondents supported raising the wage to $10.10 per hour, while 30.3 percent 
opposed the measure. 
The fifth question deals with the respondent’s race, asking, “What is your race? 
Are you white, black, Asian, or some other race?” 77 percent of respondents identified 
themselves as white, while 18.6 percent identified themselves as black. I chose to limit 
discussion to just white and black, because the survey data I used made it impossible to 
use other backgrounds. I would have like to use other races, but the small sample size 
made that impossible. 
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The sixth question asks respondents about their views on the legalization of 
same-sex marriage: “Do you favor or oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry 
legally in Virginia?” Exactly 50 percent of respondents supported legalizing same-sex 
marriage in Virginia, while 42 percent of respondents opposed legalizing same-sex 
marriage in Virginia. 
Unfortunately, respondents’ views on same-sex marriage are not a perfect 
question for determining post-materialism. While many post-material authors mention 
same-sex marriage as a contributing factor to the decline in class voting (e.g. Abramson 
and Inglehart 1992), same-sex marriage is affected by issues like religiosity, which 
skews results. However, I was constrained by questions asked in the poll, and same-
sex marriage was the best postmaterialist option in the survey. 
Analysis 
 (Table one about here) 
To test my first hypothesis in my first set of data exploring basic political beliefs, I 
compared people’s self-defined class against their party identification. With a Pearson 
Chi-Square significance of .616, these data show that there is not a significant 
correlation between respondents’ self-defined class and their political party preference. 
My hypothesis was, therefore, correct. I assume this lack of a significant relationship 
between these data as meaning postmaterial and identity issues have led to a 
breakdown of class-based voting, like scholars have pointed out (Crewe 1986, 
Weakliem 1995). Therefore, there must be some other variable that affects how 
Virginians choose their political party. 
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(Table two about here) 
To test my second hypothesis, I compared people’s self-defined class against 
their political ideology. Similar to political party, the relationship between self-defined 
class and political ideology was not trustworthy, with a Pearson Chi-Square significance 
of .234. The lack of correlation proved my hypothesis correct. Again, similar to political 
party, the close relationship between political ideology and political party (Highton and 
Kam 2011) and the breakdown of class-based party preference as mentioned above 
has likely led to this statistical insignificance (Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995). 
(Table three about here) 
To test my third hypothesis, I compared people’s self-defined class against their 
support for an increase in the minimum wage. Poor people were the most supportive of 
the increase, as expected. The data for this hypothesis were statistically significant, with 
a Chi-Square significance of .049. The data also have a Cramer’s V value of .064, 
meaning they have an extremely weak- but statistically significant- relationship. 
However, these data point to the significance of American’s class structure regarding 
materialist issues, despite the fact class has no effect on political party preference, as 
shown in hypothesis one. The data did prove my hypothesis correct, with a higher 
percentage of the working class, 72.7 percent, supporting an increase in the minimum 
wage than the middle class, 66.9 percent. These results stem from working class’s 
support for the historically liberal tradition of supporting working class economic issues 
(Bartels 2006, Brooks and Manza 1994, Weakliem 1991). 
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From the data above, we can conclude class correlates neither with political party 
nor political ideology, but class does correlate with support for an increase in the 
minimum wage. What it does not answer, however, is why Virginians vote the way they 
do. My second set of hypotheses hopes to shine some light on this issue. 
(Table four about here) 
To test my first hypothesis in my second set of hypotheses, I compared 
respondents’ race with their political party preference. The result had a near perfect Chi-
Square significance, .001, although it had a very strong relationship with a Cramer’s V 
value of .461. These data present a significant finding: there is a strong relationship 
between an individual’s political party preference and an individual’s race. The results 
also proved my hypothesis correct, with African Americans being much more likely to 
support the Democratic Party than the Republican Party, and white Americans being 
more likely to support the Republican Party than the Democratic Party. 75 percent of 
African Americans identified as members of the Democratic Party, while only four 
percent identified Republicans. 28 percent of white Americans viewed themselves as 
Democrats, while 32 percent identified as Republicans. For this survey, these results 
seem to confirm theorists’ observations of a movement to racial, identity-based political 
parties, rather than class-based political parties (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989, Edsall 
and Edsall 1991, Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991). 
(Table five about here) 
I found similar results when testing my second hypothesis. For it, I compared the 
data for those who support same-sex marriage with the data for political party. The 
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results were statistically significant with a Chi Square of .001 and had a very strong 
relationship with a Cramer’s V of .288. Similar to race and political party preference, 
these results show there is a relationship between postmaterial issues and political 
party preference. The results supported my hypothesis, with respondents who support 
same-sex marriage being more likely to support the Democratic Party than the 
Republican Party, and respondents who oppose same-sex marriage being more likely 
to support the Republican Party than the Democratic Party. 44 percent of respondents 
who support same-sex marriage identify as Democrats, while only 15 percent of 
respondents who support same-sex marriage identify as Republicans. On the other 
hand, 41 percent of respondents who oppose same-sex marriage view themselves as 
Republicans, while only 28 percent of the same group respondents who oppose same-
sex marriage view themselves as Democrats. Again, similar to race, these results seem 
to confirm theorists’ observations of a movement to postmaterial, identity-based political 
parties, rather than class-based political parties (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart 
1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998). 
(Table six about here) 
To test my third hypothesis, I compared race with support for the minimum wage. 
The data were statistically significant, with a near perfect Chi-Square significance of 
.001 and with a weak relationship with a Cramer’s V value of .258, meaning there is a 
very strong relationship between these two issues. Unfortunately, these data prove my 
hypothesis incorrect. Although both races were overwhelmingly likely to support an 
increase in the minimum wage, African Americans in particular supported the measure, 
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with 89 percent in support and only 11 percent opposed. Whites also supported an 
increase in the minimum wage, but at a lower level than African Americans. 65 percent 
of white respondents supported the measure, while 36 percent opposed it. These 
results were surprising, considering research did not allude to race having an effect on 
materialist issues (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991). 
(Table seven about here) 
For my fourth and final hypothesis, I compared support for same sex marriage 
with support for an increase in the minimum wage. Similar to race and support for an 
increase in the minimum wage, the results were statistically significant, with a near 
perfect significance of .001. These results also had a strong relationship, with a 
Cramer’s V value of .179. These data disprove my hypothesis. Again, people were 
overwhelmingly in support of increasing the minimum wage; however those who 
supported same-sex marriage were more likely to support increasing the minimum 
wage than those who oppose same-sex marriage. 77 percent of those who support 
same-sex marriage support increasing the minimum wage versus 60 percent of those 
who do not support same-sex marriage. These results contradict postmaterialist 
theories, which never indicate a relationship between support for same-sex marriage 
and support for increasing the minimum wage (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart 
1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998). 
 This project attempted to test the why the last two hypotheses contradicted the 
literature using the data, but the data came back statistically insignificant. For example, I 
took the same variables from my third hypothesis in my second set (race and support 
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for an increase in the minimum wage) and controlled for class. If I had been able to 
show that working class African Americans were more likely to support the minimum 
wage than upper class African Americans and working class whites were more likely to 
support the minimum wage than upper class whites, then the above point would have 
been moot. Unfortunately though, the data were insignificant. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
From my data there arises a very clear conclusion: for Virginians at least, class 
does not affect people’s voting habits the way past scholars here hypothesized class 
impacted United States politics. Class voting is minimal, with the data showing there is 
not a significant relationship between classes and voting behaviors anymore. Voting 
decisions, like political party preference, therefore, must come from other places 
instead.  
However, class does still matter for some issues. It still matters for materialist 
issues like support for the minimum wage, which continues to have its highest support 
from the lower classes. Second, while there is no correlation between class and political 
party preference, there is a connection between race and same-sex marriage and class 
and political party preference. This relationship is likely due to a rise in postmaterial 
ideals among Americans when choosing political parties, as illustrated by some 
theorists (Inglehart 1990, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, 
Heath 1991). 
 However, the discussion does not stop there. There are a number of other issues 
that arise from these data. First, the bulk of data relating to the class-based politics is 
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decades old, most of it coming from the early 1990s. Presumably, the United States has 
changed since then. Of course, the reason for the lack of recent research could come 
from the lack of correlation between class and voting patterns, but I think more attention 
should be paid to the reason Americans are voting against their economic self-interest. 
The United States is changing, after all. With the rise in income inequality, materialist 
issues could become more important in the future, meaning us, as political scientists, 
cannot let this issue lie fallow. 
 Second, the conclusions I draw here could be expanded if a nationwide survey is 
used. While it is useful to understand why people are not voting on class lines in 
Virginia, an explanation for the entire United States would be even more useful. 
Moreover, although Virginia may be similar to a smaller United States, it has some 
differences from the entire nation as well. For example, Virginia is a so-called “right to 
work” state, meaning union membership is not compulsory if workers vote to organize. 
This anti-union law could affect how working class Virginians view politics. 
 Third, the University of Mary Washington poll, while it did provide me with an 
excellent data set for Virginia, was missing some elements that could have added to my 
project. For example, the only postmaterial question I was able to study was the 
question about support for same-sex marriage. While support for same-sex marriage is 
one of the key elements of postmaterialism, there are other nuances that affect how one 
views same-sex marriage, like one’s religion and religiosity. Unfortunately, there were 
no questions about religion in the University of Mary Washington survey, so I was not 
able to control for religion. It would also have been beneficial to have other options for 
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postmaterial issues as well. The University of Mary Washington poll did not have 
questions dealing with women’s issues, the environment, or other postmaterial issues. 
These issues could have shed more light on the effects of postmaterialism. 
 Fourth, the theories do not account for longitudinal fluctuations caused by income 
inequality in the United States, which could raise the amount of class-based political 
party preference. It would be intriguing to see how the data have changed over time, 
and to see whether the class-based party data have dropped drastically. These data 
would be particularly interesting to see considering the meteoric rise in inequality 
(Dadush 2012). Also interesting to see would be to see the longitudinal effects of 
postmaterial and race on class. If Americans are increasingly forming dichotomous 
opinions on these issues, then the arguments would be even stronger. 
 Finally, and most importantly, there is much more research that needs to be done 
to find how people arrive at their political beliefs and with which political party they 
identify. Although some of my data point to postmaterial issues being the an important 
reason why people identify with their political party, the analysis of my third and fourth 
hypotheses in my second set of hypotheses point to larger picture. If postmaterial 
issues were the sole determinant of political party preference, there should be no 
relationship between postmaterial issues and material issues. However, both the 
relationship between race and support for minimum wage and the relationship between 
support for same-sex marriage and support for minimum wage were significant. Not 
only that, these policies also line up with the views of the Democratic Party, which leads 
me to question whether people’s political views could be affected by their party 
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preference. That is, party preference, race, postmaterial issues, and class all weave an 
intricate web that creates Americans political beliefs. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Self-Identified Class * 
Political Party 939 93.9% 61 6.1% 1000 100.0% 
Self-Identified Class * Political Party Crosstabulation 
 
Political Party 
Total Democratic Independent Republican 
Self-Identified 
Class 
Middle 
Class 
171 132 132 171 483 
35.4% 27.3% 27.3% 35.4% 100.0% 
50.1% 54.1% 54.1% 50.1% 51.4% 
18.2% 14.1% 14.1% 18.2% 51.4% 
Working 
Class 
170 112 112 170 456 
37.3% 24.6% 24.6% 37.3% 100.0% 
49.9% 45.9% 45.9% 49.9% 48.6% 
18.1% 11.9% 11.9% 18.1% 48.6% 
Total Count 341 244 341 939 
% within Self-Identified 
Class 36.3% 26.0% 36.3% 100.0% 
% within Political Party 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 36.3% 26.0% 36.3% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .968a 2 .616 
Likelihood Ratio .969 2 .616 
Linear-by-Linear Association .031 1 .861 
N of Valid Cases 939   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 118.49. 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .032 .616 
Cramer's V .032 .616 
N of Valid Cases 939  
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Table 2: 
 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Self-Identified Class * 
Political Ideology 932 93.2% 68 6.8% 1000 100.0% 
Self-Identified Class * Political Ideology Crosstabulation 
 
Political Ideology 
Total Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Self-Identified 
Class 
2.00 Count 122 201 168 491 
% within SubClass2part1 24.8% 40.9% 34.2% 100.0% 
% within ideo2 55.2% 53.9% 49.7% 52.7% 
% of Total 13.1% 21.6% 18.0% 52.7% 
3.00 Count 99 172 170 441 
% within SubClass2part1 22.4% 39.0% 38.5% 100.0% 
% within ideo2 44.8% 46.1% 50.3% 47.3% 
% of Total 10.6% 18.5% 18.2% 47.3% 
Total Count 221 373 338 932 
% within SubClass2part1 23.7% 40.0% 36.3% 100.0% 
% within ideo2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 23.7% 40.0% 36.3% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.983a 2 .371 
Likelihood Ratio 1.983 2 .371 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.800 1 .180 
N of Valid Cases 932   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 104.57. 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .046 .371 
Cramer's V .046 .371 
N of Valid Cases 932  
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Table 3: 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Self-Identified Class * 
Minimum Wage 957 95.7% 43 4.3% 1000 100.0% 
Self-Identified Class * Minimum Wage Crosstabulation 
 
Minimum Wage 
Total Support Oppose 
Self-Identified 
Class 
Middle 
Class 
Count 331 164 495 
% within Self-Identified 
Class 66.9% 33.1% 100.0% 
% within Minimum Wage 49.6% 56.6% 51.7% 
% of Total 34.6% 17.1% 51.7% 
Working 
Class 
Count 336 126 462 
% within Self-Identified 
Class 72.7% 27.3% 100.0% 
% within Minimum Wage 50.4% 43.4% 48.3% 
% of Total 35.1% 13.2% 48.3% 
Total Count 667 290 957 
% within Self-Identified 
Class 69.7% 30.3% 100.0% 
% within Minimum Wage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 69.7% 30.3% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.883a 1 .049   
Continuity Correctionb 3.611 1 .057   
Likelihood Ratio 3.893 1 .048   
Fisher's Exact Test    .049 .029 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.879 1 .049   
N of Valid Cases 957     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 140.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.064 .049 
Cramer's V .064 .049 
N of Valid Cases 957  
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Table 4: 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Race * Political Party 796 79.6% 204 20.4% 1000 100.0% 
Race * Political Party Crosstabulation 
 
Political Party 
Total Democratic Republican Independent 
Race White Count 146 220 249 615 
% within Race 23.7% 35.8% 40.5% 100.0% 
% within Political Party 51.8% 96.9% 86.8% 77.3% 
% of Total 18.3% 27.6% 31.3% 77.3% 
Black Count 136 7 38 181 
% within Race 75.1% 3.9% 21.0% 100.0% 
% within Political Party 48.2% 3.1% 13.2% 22.7% 
% of Total 17.1% 0.9% 4.8% 22.7% 
Total Count 282 227 287 796 
% within Race 35.4% 28.5% 36.1% 100.0% 
% within Political Party 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.4% 28.5% 36.1% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 168.935a 2 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 176.007 2 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 98.199 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 796   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 51.62. 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .461 .001 
Cramer's V .461 .001 
N of Valid Cases 796  
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Table 5: 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Same-Sex 
Marriage * 
Political Party 
888 88.8% 112 11.2% 1000 100.0% 
Same-Sex Marriage * Political Party Crosstabulation 
 
Political Party 
Total Democratic Republican Independent 
Same-
Sex 
Marriage 
Support Count 214 74 198 486 
% within Same-Sex 
Marriage 44.0% 15.2% 40.7% 100.0% 
% within Political 
Party 65.8% 31.2% 60.7% 54.7% 
% of Total 24.1% 8.3% 22.3% 54.7% 
Oppose Count 111 163 128 402 
% within Same-Sex 
Marriage 27.6% 40.5% 31.8% 100.0% 
% within Political 
Party 34.2% 68.8% 39.3% 45.3% 
% of Total 12.5% 18.4% 14.4% 45.3% 
Total Count 325 237 326 888 
% within Same-Sex 
Marriage 36.6% 26.7% 36.7% 100.0% 
% within Political 
Party 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 36.6% 26.7% 36.7% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 73.810a 2 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 74.659 2 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.696 1 .193 
N of Valid Cases 888   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 107.29. 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .288 .001 
Cramer's V .288 .001 
N of Valid Cases 888  
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Table 6: 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Race * Minimum Wage 809 80.9% 191 19.1% 1000 100.0% 
Race * Minimum Wage Crosstabulation 
 
Minimum Wage 
Total Support Oppose 
Race White Count 372 251 623 
% within Race 59.7% 40.3% 100.0% 
% within Minimum Wage 69.3% 92.3% 77.0% 
% of Total 46.0% 31.0% 77.0% 
Black Count 165 21 186 
% within Race 88.7% 11.3% 100.0% 
% within Minimum Wage 30.7% 7.7% 23.0% 
% of Total 20.4% 2.6% 23.0% 
Total Count 537 272 809 
% within Race 66.4% 33.6% 100.0% 
% within Minimum Wage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 66.4% 33.6% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 53.971a 1 .001   
Continuity Correctionb 52.679 1 .001   
Likelihood Ratio 61.928 1 .001   
Fisher's Exact Test    .001 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 53.904 1 .001   
N of Valid Cases 809     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 62.54. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -.258 .001 
Cramer's V .258 .001 
N of Valid Cases 809  
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Table 7: 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Same-Sex Marriage 
* Minimum Wage 901 90.1% 99 9.9% 1000 100.0% 
Same-Sex Marriage * Minimum Wage Crosstabulation 
 
Minimum Wage 
Total Support Oppose 
Same-
Sex 
Marriage 
Support Count 377 113 490 
% within Same-
Sex Marriage 76.9% 23.1% 100.0% 
% within Minimum 
Wage 60.3% 40.9% 54.4% 
% of Total 41.8% 12.5% 54.4% 
Oppose Count 248 163 411 
% within Same-
Sex Marriage 60.3% 39.7% 100.0% 
% within Minimum 
Wage 39.7% 59.1% 45.6% 
% of Total 27.5% 18.1% 45.6% 
Total Count 625 276 901 
% within Same-
Sex Marriage 69.4% 30.6% 100.0% 
% within Minimum 
Wage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 69.4% 30.6% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.980a 1 .001   
Continuity Correctionb 28.204 1 .001   
Likelihood Ratio 28.990 1 .001   
Fisher's Exact Test    .001 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 28.947 1 .001   
N of Valid Cases 901     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 125.90. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .179 .001 
Cramer's V .179 .001 
N of Valid Cases 901  
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